

Prolog to Lecture 6
CS 236
On-Line MS Program
Networks and Systems Security
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Authenticating for Small Devices

- Typical authentication mechanisms assume powerful devices
 - To run PK, for example
- What about embedded devices?
 - Small, limited hardware, poorly administered, limited battery
- Will PK authentication work for them?

Why Are They Authenticating?

- To receive commands
- To get data from other sensors
- To receive updates to their software
- To provide information to particular users
- They probably need to authenticate

Why Not PK?

- PK is expensive
 - 100X computation cost as symmetric crypto in software
 - 1000X in hardware
- Not only slow, but drains the battery
- Also issues of PK infrastructure

How About Symmetric Crypto?

- Faster and uses less power
- But poor authentication properties
 - Did I create it or did my partner?
- Also poor scaling properties
 - Which might or might not be an issue for embedded devices

Is There Another Choice?

- Maybe reverse hash chains
- Basic idea:
 - Authenticate end of hash chain via PK crypto
 - Use next link in hash chain to authenticate next message
 - And so on
 - Use PK to sign new hash chain, when needed

For Example

$X'''' \rightarrow X''' \rightarrow X'' \rightarrow X' \rightarrow X$



Alice

$$Y = E(X''''', K_{EA})$$

$$Z = F(X''', M)$$

X''', M



Bob

X''''

Z

Is $H(X''') = X''''$?

Is $Z = F(X''', M)$?

Are There Problems With This?

- Ask yourself what Bob actually knows at each step
- Are there differences between what he actually knows and what we want him to know?
- Could attackers make use of those differences?