

Evaluating System Security

CS 236

On-Line MS Program

Networks and Systems Security

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Evaluating Program Security

- What if your task isn't writing secure code?
- It's determining if someone else's code is secure
 - Or, perhaps, their overall system
- How do you go about evaluating code or a working system for security?

Secure System Standards

- Several methods proposed over the years to evaluate system security
- Meant for head-to-head comparisons of systems
 - Often operating systems, sometimes other types of systems
 - Usually for HW/SW, not working systems

Some Security Standards

- U.S. Orange Book
- Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation
- There were others we won't discuss in detail

The U.S. Orange Book

- The earliest evaluation standard for trusted operating systems
- Defined by the Department of Defense in the late 1970s
- Now largely a historical artifact

Purpose of the Orange Book

- To set standards by which OS security could be evaluated
- Fairly strong definitions of what features and capabilities an OS had to have to achieve certain levels
- Allowing “head-to-head” evaluation of security of systems
 - And specification of requirements

Orange Book Security Divisions

- A, B, C, and D
 - In decreasing order of degree of security
- Important subdivisions within some of the divisions
- Required formal certification from the government (NCSC)
 - Except for the D level

Why Did the Orange Book Fail?

- Expensive to use
- Didn't meet all parties' needs
 - Really meant for US military
 - Inflexible
- Certified products were slow to get to market
- Not clear certification meant much
 - Windows NT was C2, but that didn't mean NT was secure in usable conditions
- Review procedures tied to US government

The Common Criteria

- Modern international standards for computer systems security
- Covers more than just operating systems
 - Other software (e.g., databases)
 - Hardware devices (e.g., firewalls)
- Design based on lessons learned from earlier security standards
- Lengthy documents describe the Common Criteria

Common Criteria Approach

- The CC documents describe
 - The Evaluation Assurance Levels (EAL)
 - 1-7, in increasing order of security
- The Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) details guidelines for evaluating systems
- PP – Protection Profile
 - Implementation-independent set of security requirements

Another Bowl of Common Criteria Alphabet Soup

- TOE – Target of Evaluation
- TSP – TOE Security Policy
 - Security policy of system being evaluated
- TSF – TOE Security Functions
 - HW, SW used to enforce TSP
- ST – Security Target
 - Predefined sets of security requirements

What's the Common Criteria About?

- Highly detailed methodology for specifying :
 1. What security goals a system has?
 2. What environment it operates in?
 3. What mechanisms it uses to achieve its security goals?
 4. Why anyone should believe it does so?

How Does It Work?

- Someone who needs a secure system specifies what security he needs
 - Using CC methodology
 - Either some already defined PPs
 - Or he develops his own
- He then looks for products that meet that PP
 - Or asks developers to produce something that does

How Do You Know a Product Meets a PP?

- Dependent on individual countries
- Generally, independent labs verify that product meets a protection profile
- In practice, a few protection profiles are commonly used
- Allowing those whose needs match them to choose from existing products

Status of the Common Criteria

- In wide use
- Several countries have specified procedures for getting certifications
 - Some agreements for honoring other countries' certifications
- Many products have received various certifications

Problems With Common Criteria

- Expensive to use
- Slow to get certification
 - Certified products may be behind the market
- Practical certification levels might not mean that much
 - Windows 2000 was certified EAL4+
 - But kept requiring security patches . . .
- Perhaps more attention to paperwork than actual software security
 - Lower, commonly used EALs only look at process/documentation, not actual HW/SW